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1. On 1st May 2004, the EU will be supplemented with ten countries: the Czech Republic,
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  We only deal
with the CEECs including Bulgaria and Romania whose accession is postponed until 2007 or 2008,
according to the latest declarations by EU officials.  Because of data limitations, we restrict our
sample of Mediterranean economies to five countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey.
This paper evaluates the effects of the enlargement of the EU to the Central
and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), focusing on agglomeration and industrial
specialisation patterns in Europe.  We first present the theoretical debate based on
the New Economic Geography models.  The outcome is that, in spite of the lack
of labour mobility within the EU, a core periphery schema is expected to occur as
a result of vertical linkages.  Then, we provide evidence on real and structural conver-
gence and FDI trends in the enlarged EU.  We show that sectoral divergence resulting
from agglomeration economies is likely to persist through a high-skilled core attracting
increasing intensive activities and a low-skilled periphery.  By discussing two alter-
native scenarios in terms of international specialisation, we show that Central
European countries are likely to follow a “Spanish model” based on catching-up,
industrial diversification and intra-industry trade, while Eastern countries could durably
lag behind.  Similarly, the Mediterranean economies, which are engaged in the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, exhibit very complementary international specialisation
relative to the EU through resource- and labour-intensive industries.
E
ach new step of the European unification brings about concerns
relative to the impact of regional integration on production
structures within the Member States.  The economic geography
of Europe faces some new challenges with the imminent enlargement
to the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and the imple-
mentation of association agreements with Southern and Eastern
Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs)1: how will the location of activitiesand specialisation patterns be affected by the accession of countries
that exhibit various production structures and remote levels of
development?  Will industrial agglomeration processes in an integrated
area be stronger than dispersion and diversification forces among parti-
cipating nations?  What lessons can we derive from the experience of
the preceding waves of enlargement of the EU? 
This article aims at discussing two opposite scenarios as regards
future prospects of the European economic geography.  According to
the first one, the predominance of intra-industry trade within European
nations results in weak specialisation in terms of production and
employment.  Thus, it privileges the optimistic view of overall economic
convergence between the EU Member States.  For example, the
Emerson report (1990) underlines the current macroeconomic conver-
gence of European countries and proves to be hopeful when
considering the impact of monetary integration.  This report considers
that “EMU would reduce the incidence of country-specific shocks”.  In
the same vein, Frankel and Rose (1998) argue that “increased
integration may result in more highly correlated business cycles because
of common demand shocks or intra-industry trade”.  The risks of
asymmetric shocks and increased spatial disparities resulting from strong
relocation of activities are thus smaller than expected.  This kind of
prediction suggests a minimal common framework of well-developed
redistributive policies across European nations.
Another point of view provided by the United States experience
has been developed by some economists like Paul Krugman.  According
to the New Economic Geography (NEG) framework, he argues that
deeper integration would translate into increased specialisation resulting
from inter-industry comparative advantages.  The Member States would
specialise in a small number of activities and therefore would be more
sensitive to asymmetric shocks.  In NEG models, economic integration
leads to a spatial core-periphery schema, resulting in higher agglome-
ration and increased specialisation detrimental to peripheral countries
(Krugman, 1991a).
A French report by the Commissariat Général du Plan (CGP, 1999)
took a position between these two opposite points of view.  It
concluded that countries entering into the EMU were rather diversified
and would preserve most of their activities.  Intra-European trade is
mainly of intra-industry type but traded goods within the EU are
predominantly vertically differentiated.  Therefore, EU countries face
structural and technological asymmetries, which can lead to more
agglomerated production structures.  However, polarisation is less
likely to occur across nations where production structures are rather
homogeneous than across regions, which are diverging within all
European nations.
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Mediterranean economies in the discussion.  We ask if the new incum-
bents are more likely to follow an intra-industry specialisation path or,
conversely, a deeper specialisation according to traditional comparative
advantages.  In the first case, the CEECs would experience more indus-
trial diversification with increasing intra-industry trade that characterises
developed or catching-up economies.  In the second case, the risks of
asymmetric shocks would be stronger in countries that develop trade
relations with the EU based on their specialisation in traditional labour-
intensive industries.  When confronting our assumptions with empirical
evidence, we find that two different groups of countries can be drawn
up according to production structures, trade openness and FDI inflows.
Only Central European countries tend to develop intra-industry trade
with the EU countries and are likely to catch up with the EU average
while the more peripheral countries in Eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean economic partners still exhibit high levels of speciali-
sation in traditional sectors.  As a result, the European economic
geography indicates a persistent core-periphery structure.
The article is organised as follows.  First, we put forward the impact
of regional integration on the distribution of industrial activities across
Member States in a theoretical perspective.  In a second section, we
gather the main stylised facts on real and structural convergence
between candidate countries and the EU, and discuss the likely effects
of FDI on specialisation dynamics.  The third section of the article
evaluates how much the Member States are specialised in an enlarged
Union and the last one brings some elements of comparison with the
SEMCs.
1. The theoretical framework
Economists identify two different sources of potential benefits from
the EU integration: an improvement in the allocation of resources and
the accumulation of further resources (Baldwin, 1994).  However, the
overall effects of deeper integration on the national economies are
more ambiguous and depend on regional characteristics.  Thus, uneven
economic development can result from unevenly distributed natural
resources and endowments.  This distribution depends on exogenous
regions’ natural advantages.  Although relevant in some specific cases
(mining or fishing activities), this analysis cannot explain the main
features of location and specialisation patterns in Europe.
The New Economic Geography (NEG) ensuing from the standard
location theory describes economic forces which inflect the geogra-
phical distribution of activities.  One of the main contributions of NEG
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dispersion and agglomeration forces appears, depending on the
integration level2.
These forces result from the interactions between imperfect compe-
tition, economies of scale and agglomeration externalities3.  Firms and
workers trade off between advantages from agglomeration economies
and mobility and transaction costs.  The regional integration, assimilated
to a decrease in transaction costs, encourages firms to concentrate in
order to benefit from economies of scale.  As in “new trade theory”
models, increasing-returns-intensive sectors (so-called “modern”
sectors) will be disproportionately present in regions with good market
access (Krugman, 1980).  Moreover, associated with this home market
effect, NEG models show that the market size increases as manufac-
turing agglomerates.  Consequently, a cumulative causation can occur
under some conditions.
Two kinds of NEG models explain the agglomeration process based
on two different mechanisms.  First, the Core-Periphery model
(Krugman, 1991b) assumes labour mobility across regions.  It shows
that agglomeration of the modern sector is the unique stable equili-
brium as soon as transaction costs are sufficiently low.  In this case, the
cumulative gains increase for both geographically mobile consumers and
industrial firms (see box 1)4.  
According to this model, the Eastern enlargement is expected to
induce higher agglomeration towards the core European regions.  So,
most of the CEECs would be marginalized.  However, the European
experience exhibits some specificities that moderate the probability that
such an agglomeration process occurs.  To a large extent, the geogra-
phical mobility assumption used in core-periphery models is irrelevant
in the European context (Bailly et al., 2003).  These models are more
suited in the context of regional economies within nations than for
studying international integration.  Without labour migration, concen-
tration of firms cannot induce any agglomeration of workers.  The
core-periphery cumulative causation disappears.  The effects of
European integration on location pattern are better explained by a
second generation of NEG models.
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2. See Ottaviano and Puga (1998) for a survey of NEG literature and Fujita et al. (1999),
Neary (2001), Ottaviano and Thisse (2001 and 2003) or Baldwin et al.  (2003) for more details.
3. All these externalities describe two kinds of interactions.  On the one hand, so-called
“technological externalities” occur outside the markets and act directly on the consumers’ utility
function or the firms’ production function.  Their formalisation is rare because difficult (see Rieber
and Tran, 2001 for an example).  On the other hand, so-called “pecuniary externalities” imply
market-mechanisms-based interactions.
4. This result from the core-periphery model can be found under alternative assumptions:
imperfect labour mobility (Ludema and Wooton, 1999), differentiating skills levels in the modern
sector (Amiti and Pissarides, 2002), taste heterogeneity (Tabuchi and Thisse, 2001) or forward-
looking expectations (Baldwin, 2001).  All of these assumptions have no qualitative effect on the
core-periphery model’s behaviour.1 1. .   F Fo or rw wa ar rd d   a an nd d   b ba ac ck kw wa ar rd d   lliin nk ka ag ge es s   a an nd d   N NE EG G   m mo od de ells s
NEG models’ assumptions
NEG models usually combine two regions and two sectors.  Regions are
identical in tastes, technologies and endowments but sectors differ.  The agricul-
tural sector produces a homogeneous output under constant returns to scale
and perfect competition.  An agricultural good is freely traded so its price is
identical in both regions.  The manufacturing sector is imperfectly competitive
and produces many varieties under increasing returns to scale.  Following Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977), production of any variety in the same proportion in any
region requires the same fixed and variable quantities of input with a linear cost
function.  Moreover, each firm produces only one variety.
Considering two regions requires focusing on trade costs between them.
Under trade costs, NEG models not only include physical transport costs, but
also monetary conversion, linguistic and cultural differences or specific norms.
They are formalised as “iceberg” transport technology, initially introduced by
Samuelson, in which only a fraction of a good arrives in the other region.  The
remaining production is consumed by transport necessities and importing more
and more differentiated goods from other countries induces a price index
increase.
The forward and backward linkages: description 
The equilibrium location of firms is caused by interactions between centri-
fugal and centripetal forces depending on the transaction costs level.  The
centripetal (centrifugal) forces include all economic relations promoting concen-
tration (dispersion) of economic activities.  The centripetal forces can be
self-sustaining.  They constitute a cumulative causation then recalling Myrdal’s
concept.  A change in a variable induces an adjustment in another variable,
which in turn reinforces the first change.
Each of the forward and backward linkages describes one part of these
two causal elements.  The forward linkages depict how an agent is linked to
its suppliers while the backward linkages illustrate how an economic agent is
linked to its customers.
Why agglomeration occurs in the core-periphery models?
In a core-periphery model with mobile workforce, the cumulative causation
takes place between the industrial firms and the consumers.  Thus, the forward
linkage explains how industrial agglomeration incites workers to migrate.
Manufacturing concentration generates both a decrease in the regional price
index (the share of imported goods decreases) and an increase in the regional
nominal wage (following increasing competition).  The regional real wage
increase attracts more workers.  This forward linkage takes place through an
income effect.
Consecutively, migration induces a growing of industrial expenditures
through the growth of regional income.  This home market effect attracts indus-
trial firms and constitutes the backward linkage.
Why agglomeration occurs in the vertical linkage models?
The vertical linkage models assume geographically immobile workers.  The
cumulative causation then differs.  An input-output structure of production is
introduced in the industrial sector.  We distinguish between upstream-supplier
firms and downstream-customer firms.  Consequently, the forward (backward)
linkage describes how agglomeration of supplier (customers) firms induces
concentration of customers (supplier) firms.
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location generate an increased variety of intermediate goods at a lower
price through the newly exploited externalities.  Then producers of final
goods are attracted.  The following backward linkage is a demand effect.
Concentration of more downstream firms in this same location has two
complementary consequences.  On the one hand, it increases the
regional wage.  On the other hand, production by the relocated firm
is no longer imported and consumers benefit from the disappearance
of trade costs for this new variety.  In the end, regional manufacturing
expenditures rise, attracting more upstream firms.
The Vertical-Linkage models (Krugman and Venables, 1995;
Venables, 1996) describe another agglomeration process based on two
main relationships between these firms.  The backward linkages mean
that firms gain from being located close to their customers.  This link
is related to a demand effect.  The forward linkages depict the firms’
advantages from being located close to their suppliers.  This is a
production cost effect.  Downstream firms use upstream firms’
production as an intermediate input.  Clustering of European activities
is explained not only by the access to customers but also by the access
to suppliers through an input-output structure described by Hirschman
(1958).  Firms take advantage from increasing returns to scale as trade
costs on imported goods decrease sharply.  Then, forward and
backward linkages specific to these models succeed in explaining the
agglomeration process without labour mobility (see box 1).
Both vertical-linkage and core-periphery models conclude that
further integration leads to more agglomeration.  However, this relation
is non-monotonic.  Industrial agglomeration causes a regional wage diffe-
rential.  Now, the immobility of workforce cannot equal the regional
remuneration and wage competition becomes a centrifugal force.  At
low trade costs, firms become more and more sensitive to cost diffe-
rentials, leading the “modern” sector to spread out (Puga, 1999).  When
the first stages of integration occur, the forward and backward linkages
induce a manufacturing clustering which is self-sustaining.  A core-
periphery pattern appears and entails differences in regional wages.  In
the last stages of integration, this wage differential can be enough to
make a peripheral location profitable.  Symmetry takes place again
where the labour intensive activities relocate in low-cost regions.
Consequences of such models for the EU enlargement are
noteworthy and depend on the initial integration level.  Further
integration could increase the probability that industry spreads out as
a result of wage differentials among nations.  Southern European
countries should attract low-skilled intensive industries while the high-
skilled intensive activities would remain in the core.  Thus, divergence
in income from the core-periphery pattern is likely to be followed by
a sectoral divergence across the European regions.
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In a tri-sectoral model, Jennequin (2003) associates industrial and
Knowledge Intensive Based Services (KIBS) which are supposed to
produce under increasing returns to scale with differentiated output.  An
input-output structure is assumed between them.  The author proves
that upstream services activities employing high-skilled mobile workers
play a significant role in the design of international economic geography.
The CEECs could suffer from future migration of their highly-skilled
workforce and experience strong relocation of activities in favour of
core countries, both in the KIBS and manufacturing production.
The NEG literature provides further conclusions about the forth-
coming enlargement.  A model by Puga and Venables (1999) shows
that catching-up can occur by waves of industrialisation when
integration includes more than two countries.  Assuming exogenous
technical progress, industrial centres tend to develop and may become
too large to be restricted to their initial location.  When wage diffe-
rentials are sufficiently high, industry spreads to another country to
benefit from low labour costs and economies of scale.  More specifi-
cally to Eastern countries, the Manzocchi and Ottaviano’s model (2001)
underlines the role of productivity in the transition process.  They prove
that deeper integration associated with convergence in the productivity
levels would enable them to increase their national income, to attract
a growing number of investments in the capital-intensive sectors and
to upgrade their international specialisation in these sectors.
In addition to these theoretical works, Computational General
Equilibrium (CGE) models are used in order to evaluate NEG models’
conclusions and estimate the effects of the future enlargement on the
European economies5.  A CGE model by Forslid et al. (2002a) assumes
that the enlargement will induce an increase in the CEECs’ productivity
level6.  Without considering investment-related effects, real income
would increase by 15% on average as a result of a 5% increase in
productivity level.  These productivity-related gains could prove to be
an efficient remedy against exclusion.  However, considering the uneven
success in the transition process, the Balkan countries and, to a lesser
extent, the Baltic countries seem to suffer from weak productivity gains.
This point can partly explain current divergence patterns between
Eastern countries.  Nevertheless, the relation between integration and
real income materialises through productivity gains.  When the authors
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5. Most of CGE models are characterised by monopolistic competition and an input-output
structure.  Some simulations concern the EU integration in the nineties before enlargement.  For
example Francois (2002) simulates a reduction in trade costs corresponding to 2% of the value
of trade.  The gains in national income rise to 0.34% on average in the EU.  They are higher for
the 1995 new members and increase with the workers’ mobility.  Forslid et al. (2002b) find a
non-monotonic relation between trade costs and the distribution of sectors characterised by
increasing returns to scale and substantial intra-industry linkages.
6. Selected countries are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia.directly simulated the effect of a 5% decrease in trade costs, growth
in real income is estimated at 3.3% and exports growth at 29%.
In another work by Baldwin et al. (1997) Eastern integration is
assimilated to a 10% decrease in trade costs, related both to the Single
Market access and to the adoption of the EU’s common external tariff.
The real income should rise by 1.5% and exports from the CEECs by
25% (respectively by 0.2% and 1.5% in the EU).  Consequently, the
CEECs would catch up with the EU.  The authors also suggest that the
gains from the decrease of the CEECs risk premium would largely
dominate all other integration benefits.  Moreover, inside the EU, the
core countries (Germany, France, the United Kingdom) get two-thirds
of the estimated gains.  More recently, Bchir and Maurel (2002) examine
several alternative scenarios on the possible costs and benefits from
the EU enlargement.  Overall effects are rather limited for EU countries
while the main impact is expected for Eastern countries.
However, all these benefits coming from the enlargement are highly
sensitive to the necessarily simplified CGE models’ structure and to the
size of the decrease in trade costs.  Only intuitions can be provided.
In the same way, the distribution of expected gains across countries
and sectors is insufficiently explained.
All this literature seems to indicate the feasibility of catching-up for
the CEECs.  However, many uncertainties remain. How will integration
affect productivity and investment? Should we expect deeper sectoral
divergence as a result of the enlargement? Conclusions arising from
theories and simulations need to be supported by further analysis of
location patterns within the enlarged EU.  Prior to their accession in the
EU, what are the main stylised facts about international specialisation of
CEECs?  The EU enlargement is likely to modify in many ways the future
European economic geography.  The next section investigates the main
features of accession countries in real and structural terms.  In particular,
we insist on FDI-related impacts on specialisation patterns.
2.What is the impact of the enlargement on EU
specialisation and location patterns?
2.1. Real and structural convergence: stylised facts for CEECs
At the beginning of the transition towards a market-based economy,
mass privatisation and macroeconomic stabilisation programmes were
implemented in CEECs.  Meanwhile, the former USSR economically and
politically collapsed and the first trade agreements with EEC (the EU’s
predecessor) were adopted.  As a consequence, the CEECs’ trade flows
Sébastien Dupuch, Hugues Jennequin and El Mouhoub Mouhoud
8 8
Special issue/March 2004were largely redirected towards the EU countries thanks to proximity
advantages and cultural links.  In 2000, the EU members took around
two thirds of the CEECs exports whereas they accounted for only 50%
in 1993.
The question of their potential for economic catching-up becomes
crucial with the formal integration of these countries into the EU.  In
terms of per capita GDP, the newcomers lag behind EU members more
than did Spain, Greece and Portugal when they joined the EEC (table 1).
Slovenia, by far the most advanced country among CEECs, reaches 70%
of EU per capita GDP compared with an average of 45% in the other
Central and Eastern European countries.  These countries are engaged
in a slow convergence process towards the EU as their GDP growth
rates have not largely suffered from the decline in the world economy.
In the more peripheral countries, differences in economic levels are
much more pronounced.  However, the Baltic States have experienced
high growth rates for several years while Bulgaria and Romania still have
per capita GDP levels under 30% of the EU average.
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  1980  1985  1991  1995  1999  2001 
EU-9  1           
EU-10    1         
EU-15      1  1  1  1 
Spain    0.70  0.78  0.78  0.82  0.84 
Portugal    0.55  0.68  0.69  0.72  0.69 
Greece  0.65  0.65  0.63  0.61  0.62  0.64 
Czech Republic        0.62  0.59  0.57 
Estonia        0.34  0.39  0.42 
Poland        0.34  0.39  0.40 
Slovenia        0.63  0.68  0.69 
Hungary        0.45  0.50  0.51 
Slovakia        0.46  0.49  0.48 
Latvia        0.25  0.29  0.33 
Bulgaria        0.33  0.28  0.28 
Lithuania        0.32  0.34  0.38 
Romania        0.28  0.24  0.25 
1. PPP per capita GDP in the CEECs relative to the EU average
Sources : CEPII-CHELEM, Eurostat.
Catching-up patterns are rather specific in the CEECs.  They have
been transition economies but not underdeveloped ones.  They were
initially much industrialised and were endowed with skilled and low-cost
labour forces.  When compared with the EU levels, the share of
manufacturing remains high both in terms of employment and value
added, especially in the Czech Republic and Slovenia.  While the shareof manufacturing remains high, the increasing importance of services in
value added is a relevant indicator of structural convergence, as it
happened to be in the less advanced EU countries, such as Portugal or
Greece (Midelfart-Knarvik et al., 2002).  Tertiary activities represent
more than 60% of the value added in most of the candidate countries
(Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Baltic States).  Moreover, the share
of services developed faster than in countries where they were initially
undersized.  As tertiary industries are associated with non-tradable
goods, they are much more dispersed than manufacturing activities and
their development can restrict specialisation dynamics.
However, high structural disparities can be observed both vis-à-vis
the EU and within the candidate countries.  Wages and productivity
differences are large.  Slovenian nominal wages are more than twice as
high as in other Central European countries while wages in Bulgaria and
Romania remain the lowest.  Although wage growth rates are higher
in the candidate countries than in the EU, productivity gains allow them
to keep a strong competitive advantage in terms of unit labour costs
(including wages and social contributions).  According to this index
(chart 1), all the candidate countries are advantaged relative to the EU
countries, especially in sectors sensitive to price competitiveness.  Only
Slovenia shows an index close to Greece while Bulgaria, Romania and
Slovakia, where labour costs are only 10% of the EU average, still rank
at the bottom of the table.
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1. Relative unit labour costs in 2000
EU-15 = 1
Sources: Eurostat, authors' calculations.Regarding skill levels, evidence in the candidate countries relative to
the EU is mixed.  Human capital measures are complex and unsatis-
factory as they only take into account educational attainment and
exclude experience and skills acquired throughout professional life7.
Barro and Lee’s (2000) human capital measure is an indicator of educa-
tional attainment.  The accession countries are rather homogenous from
this point of view.  Except for Slovenia, the CEECs often benefit from
higher educational levels than other developed countries.  However,
considering the education level of active people (Landesmann, 2003)
discloses that around 30% of workers have not reached a secondary
school level both in the candidate countries and in the more advanced
EU members.  This share reaches more than 40% in Bulgaria and
Romania and even 60% in the Southern Europe.  On the other hand,
the EU members have a higher share of high-skilled workers (the share
of active population with a tertiary education level), around 20%, while
it reaches no more than 14% in the CEECs.  Finally, R&D expenditures
can provide a good approximation of economic and technological
catching-up (table 2).  Overall, the index is appreciably lower in the
CEECs than in the EU, except in Slovenia and the Czech Republic where
it converges towards the EU standards.  Moreover, it has remained
stable and even decreased in some cases because of budgetary restric-
tions linked to the transition process.
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2. R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP
  1995  2000 
Czech Republic  1.01  1.33 
Poland  0.69  0.70 
Hungary  0.73  0.80 
Slovenia  1.69  1.52 
Slovakia  0.94  0.67 
Estonia  0.61  0.66 
Latvia  0.53  0.48 
Lithuania  0.48  0.60 
Bulgaria  0.62  0.52 
Romania  0.80  0.37 
EU-15  1.89  1.93 
Source: Eurostat, 2002b.
7. A survey by Eurostat (2002a) on training throughout professional life in the accession
countries usefully complements the usual data on educational level as a proxy for human capital.
It shows that Czech and Estonian enterprises, especially the largest ones, invest massively for the
training of their employees.  By contrast, firms that do not invest in training mainly consider that
their labour force already has appropriate skills.  Thus, the survey provides useful information on
the match between existing skills and the needs of a competitive market-based economy.2.2. The likely effects of deeper EU integration
on international specialisation
As deeper integration is ongoing, inward FDI in the new EU incum-
bents can accelerate the emergence of two opposite patterns as regards
industrial specialisation (Mouhoud, 1997).
First, we will characterise by inter-industry specialisation a
development of trade flows based predominantly on differences in
factor endowments.  This can confine countries whose specialisation is
driven by traditional and unskilled labour-intensive industries in a low-
development trap.  Instead of building conditions that would allow them
to compete on global markets, some countries could attempt to exploit
their own comparative advantages.  The integration process may induce
trade-diverting effects in favour of the new members.  It would
encourage in these countries a specialisation based on classical compa-
rative advantages that could lock them in traditional sectors and reduce
the opportunity for an intra-industry trade upgrading.
Second,  intra-industry specialisation can be considered as the most
favourable case.  After the enlargement, the future EU will include both
developed and backward countries.  This could heighten the emergence
of spillover effects that would play a great role in the definition of
specialisation patterns.  The transition countries are initially very indus-
trialised and well endowed in physical capital, transport and
telecommunications infrastructure, although necessitating modernisation
and disconnected from EU networks.  The project of future EU enlar-
gement(s) was sufficiently credible for firms, anticipating the formal
integration, to have decided for a long time past to establish production
units or joint-venture agreements with the aim of benefiting from first-
mover advantages in the perspective of expansion strategies on local
markets.  In this context, economic and technological catching-up
processes can be enhanced and intra-industry trade can intensify.
Two distinct strategies as regards FDI can be associated with these
two types of specialisation patterns.  In the context of deeper inter-
industry specialisation, vertical-type multinational strategies dominate.
Multinational firms disperse their production activities according to host
countries’ comparative advantages.  The more labour-intensive
production stages, such as assembly, are relocated in countries with
cheaper labour forces.  These newly established affiliates generate
imports of intermediate goods and exports of final goods between
home and host countries, as well as growing intra-firm trade.  Given
that this FDI is motivated by differences in factor endowments, they
hasten an international division of labour which helps to reinforce inter-
industry specialisation patterns.
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are stimulated mainly by expansion on local markets.  In that case, the
ownership of specific asset or technological advantages allows a multi-
national firm to establish different production units in order to serve
domestic markets and benefit from scale economies at the firm level
and not only at the plant level.  Foreign investors give priority to
proximity as this means they can be more reactive to the preference
of consumers for differentiated goods.  This type of FDI is more likely
to occur between countries whose preferences are similar (Brainard,
1993; Markusen, 1995).  This investment depends on market access
considerations and the search for complementarities in technology and
know-how.  It is then more likely to occur in technology-intensive indus-
tries or in sectors that produce non-tradable goods and services.  It
contributes both to increasing the number and improving the quality of
products, and helps to reinforce intra-industry trade patterns, especially
in quality-differentiated goods (Fontagné et al., 1998).
In the case of candidate countries, intra-industry specialisation is
likely to be enhanced thanks to inward FDI, especially in the Central
European ones (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia).
However, in the more peripheral and lagging behind countries, FDI
could contribute to the persistence of inter-industry specialisation.  Until
now, FDI has materialised in two main specific ways.  First, foreign firms
were associated with the mass privatisation programmes of former
state-owned enterprises.  While they have to share risks associated
with the future profitability of the new entities, they benefit from being
favourably positioned to gain local market shares.  They can potentially
bring technology and managerial methods that help the adaptation of
transition economies.  Second, FDI can be realised through joint-venture
agreements and strategic alliances.  Overall, mergers and acquisitions
(including joint-venture agreements) have accounted for the bulk of FDI
since the end of the eighties.  In the case of CEECs, acquisitions are
more frequent than the creation of wholly-owned affiliates because of
privatisation programmes (Toubal, 2001).
2.3. FDI trends in the CEECs
Despite the world economic slowdown, inward FDI is still increasing
in Eastern and Central Europe.  Their transitional nature has favoured
the attractiveness of FDI.  In 2002, the stock of inward FDI in CEECs
reached more than USD 146 billion, whereas it was marginal ten years
ago (table 3).  The share of FDI in the candidate countries’ economies
is significantly higher than their representation in the total world flow
would suggest.  In relative terms, FDI stock as a percentage of GDP
is around 30%, which is similar to the EU level, whereas the CEECs
have received investment flows for only a dozen years.  However, FDI
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the EU area.  As the EU shifts from 15 countries to 25, inward European
FDI stock will rise by only 4%.
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2002  FDI stocks 
(USD million) 
As a % of 
national GDP 
As a % of 
total CEECs  per inhabitant 
Czech Republic  38,450  52.05  26.17  3,767 
Estonia  4,226  61.21  2.88  3,105 
Slovenia  5,074  21.70  3.45  2,545 
Hungary  24,416  34.94  16.62  2,400 
Slovakia  10,225  40.66  6.96  1,901 
CEECs-10  146,920  30.09  100.00  1,427 
Poland  45,150  22.55  30.73  1,179 
Latvia  2,723  30.46  1.85  1,161 
Lithuania  3,981  26.63  2.71  1,145 
Bulgaria  3,889  23.45  2.65  493 
Romania  8,786  18.17  6.00  402 
3. The distribution of FDI stock in the candidate countries
Sources: UNCTAD and Eurostat, authors' calculations.
Within candidate countries, FDI is not uniformly distributed.  In
absolute terms, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary concentrate
more than 75 % of total FDI stock in the region while FDI in the Balkan
and Baltic countries is rather low.  In relative terms, concentration is
much less evident since a small country such as Estonia has received
the highest FDI stock as a percentage of GDP.  As far as geographic
source is concerned, FDI mainly comes from the EU (80% in 2000).
More precisely, half of total investment originates from three countries:
the Netherlands, Germany and France, which became the largest
investor country in 2000 with a 21% share, having been only 5% in
19988.
Several factors explain such a rise in FDI towards CEECs.  First, the
new environment, especially the legal environment, allowed investors
to engage in operations that were formerly unfeasible.  Then, economic
transition and real perspectives of integration with the EU have contri-
buted to improve attractiveness.  Second, specific characteristics of
CEECs make them an attractive location for multinational firms.  The
availability of a relatively cheap and well-educated labour force is a
strong advantage combined with a large-sized potential market (Dupuch
8. The Netherlands is a particular case as a source country: due to the presence of holding
companies, so that investing firms are not fully Dutch and the share of FDI from the Netherlands
is overestimated.and Milan, 2003).  Moreover, privatisation programmes occurred while
competition was still weak, which motivated multinational firms to
engage in a race for first-mover-type advantages.  Other forms of direct
investment followed privatisations, such as major holdings in, and acqui-
sition of, existing enterprises or the creation of ex nihilo production units.
Once the enlargement is concluded, new FDI flows are likely to
occur in spite of the decline of privatisations for two reasons.  First,
the previous enlargement waves were followed by significant rises in
FDI inflows into the new accession countries.  This was particularly the
case of Spain and Portugal after 1986 although Spain had at the same
time liberalised its legal framework towards FDI while CEECs have
already done so for a long time.  Second, investors’ uncertainty about
economic, political and institutional stability will vanish with the formal
accession of these economies to the EU.  However, new amounts of
FDI will depend on how large an integration effect has been expected
by investors.  Although the potential of FDI has largely been exploited
in the past ten years, some countries such as Slovakia, Romania and
Bulgaria could receive a non-negligible amount of FDI in the future
(Henriot, 2003).
In spite of significant improvements in the recent years, available
data relative to the industrial distribution of FDI in the CEECs remain
relatively scarce.  The first estimates published in 1997 by UNCTAD
revealed that FDI was mainly located in tertiary activities in the most
advanced transition countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary and
Slovenia) and more importantly in manufacturing sectors and traditional
activities in Poland and Romania.  In the first case, this result highlights
the potential positive role played by FDI in changing patterns of specia-
lisation in these economies.  As a consequence, the location of FDI in
non-traditional industries is likely to favour the development of intra-
industry trade with the EU countries.  In the latter case, the
concentration of FDI in home countries’ comparative advantage indus-
tries is likely to reinforce specialisation in traditional industries9.
A recent study by Eurostat (2002b) based on 1999 FDI stock data
confirms this view.  With 54% of total inward investment in candidate
countries, tertiary activities are the main recipient sector.  It also reveals
strong disparities across countries and distinguishes three groups of
countries.  The first one is the special case of Bulgaria, where manufac-
turing industries dominate the industrial distribution of inward FDI
stock.  Food industries, metals and chemicals are the main recipient
sectors.  We find in the second group Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and
the Czech Republic, where FDI is more balanced.  Services account for
51 to 53% of total stock and particularly trade and financial activities.
At the manufacturing level, some differences can be highlighted.  Food
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9. For the case of Poland, the reader is referred to Weresa (2001).products are an attractive industry in Poland.  Metals, machinery and
equipment goods receive the highest share of FDI in Slovakia.  Chemicals
are the main attractive sector in Slovenia.  Finally, tertiary activities are
strongly privileged (more than 2/3 of total FDI stock) in the Baltic States,
which form the last group.  The main recipient sectors are trade and
distribution, financial activities, and transport and telecommunications.
We adapted table 4 from Landesmann (2003) who collected stock
data at the end of 2000 in a sample of CEECs.  Overall, table 4 depicts
the same picture as Eurostat data.  FDI inflows are more intense in
tertiary activities in Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary than in
other Central European countries such as Slovakia, where basic metals
account for a significant share of FDI.  The share of services is markedly
higher in the Baltic States while manufacturing activities, such as food
and automotive products (in Poland) and metals (in Slovakia), account
for around half of manufacturing FDI.
We can go further in the analysis of FDI industrial distribution by
adopting the classification proposed by Pavitt (1984), (see the
appendix).  This distinguishes traditional, scale-intensive and knowledge-
based industries according to a more disaggregated industrial data set
built from national sources in three countries (table 5).
Slovenia and the Czech Republic have rather similar shares of inward
FDI in increasing-returns industries, which account for 68% to 74% of
total FDI in manufacturing.  In the Czech case, traditional industries still
account for an important share.  By contrast, Bulgaria displays a very
different picture as the Eurostat survey already suggested: FDI stock is
more abundant in manufacturing than in services.  Moreover, traditional
industries receive as much foreign investment as scale-intensive indus-
tries.  Consequently, FDI in Bulgaria tends to reinforce existing
comparative advantages and specialisation in labour-intensive industries
whose competitiveness depends essentially on cost considerations.
To sum up, FDI inflows in the candidate countries are unevenly distri-
buted across countries and across sectors.  Foreign investments in
medium-high technology industries with a high growth potential are
noteworthy.  As FDI favours the emergence of competitive firms that
are able to influence the patterns of comparative advantages, foreign
presence can play a key role in the transformation of manufacturing in
host countries.  Consequently, according to the two scenarios described
earlier, we can distinguish countries where FDI benefits industries where
host countries still have comparative advantages and countries where
FDI is oriented towards the home country’s comparative-advantage
industries.
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FDI in the CEECs.  On the one hand, cost advantages make them
attractive for foreign firms’ industrial relocation by means of both FDI
and international subcontracting.  In unskilled labour-intensive industries
(for example assembly stages in clothing, leather, footwear or electrical
materials) international subcontracting operations with the CEECs inten-
sified in the beginning of the transition process, especially under
outward-processing trade.  These operations played a key role in the
growth of manufacturing exports of these countries with the EU
(Chevallier et al., 1999).  Nevertheless, increasing labour costs during
the transition process make such an advantage transitory, especially in
the most advanced candidate countries (Resmini, 2000).  On the other
hand, weak potential demand can be perceived as a barrier to FDI for
the purpose of penetrating Eastern markets.  Nevertheless, increasing
purchasing power and the perspective of formal integration make this
aspect transitory again.
Considering that industries in which foreign firms mostly export their
sales can be seen as the consequence of relocation strategies, Eltetö
(1998) concludes that around 40% of FDI in Hungary is the result of
such a strategy while 60% is motivated by market access considera-
tions.  More recently, Aussillioux and Pajot (2001) showed that French
FDI in the CEECs is driven by home country’s comparative-advantage
industries with the clear exception of Romania and Turkey where
relocation strategies predominate.
As a consequence, FDI flows can contribute to the transformation
of international specialisation and help to improve R&D- and skilled-
labour industrial content.  Despite weak R&D intensities, some of the
candidate countries that were formerly endowed with national
innovation systems are shifting from specialisation based on low-
technology industries towards medium-to-high technology industries.  In
1996, the CEECs mainly produced down- and medium-market goods
but great differences exist in the structure of CEECs’ trade with EU
countries.  Down-market goods represent 44% of Hungarian exports
while the figure reaches 73% of Romanian exports.  By contrast, the
share of up-market goods varies from 31% in Slovenia and 28% in
Hungary to a low 8% in Romania.  Between 1993 and 1996, the relative
position in up-market products improved for all Central European
countries, which strongly contrasts with the situation of Latvia, Lithuania
and the Balkan countries.  In the former case, this result excludes the
scenario of locking specialisation in traditional sectors (Freudenberg and
Lemoine, 1999)
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.3. Trade specialisation patterns in an enlarged Union
3.1. International specialisation in the EU-25
Many papers have described empirical evidence on the location of
activity in the EU10.  The distribution of activities follows the same
trend with an increasing relative concentration over the last two
decades (Dupuch and Jennequin, 2001).  Distinction between industrial
characteristics provides more precise information.  The European
periphery predominantly attracts labour- and low-tech intensive
activities whereas high-tech, high-skilled or increasing-returns-to-scale-
intensive activities are more spatially agglomerated in the core regions
(Midelfart-Knarvik et al., 2002).
While specialisation in the US seems to be declining, it has increased
within the EU since the 1970’s.  Moreover, peripheral countries like
Portugal, Finland and Greece exhibit a more pronounced specialisation
than core countries (Dupuch et al., 2001).  At the regional level, studies
are quite mixed in their conclusions.  No significant tendency emerges
in the EU (Combes and Overman, 2003).
2 2. .   T Th he e   K Kr ru ug gm ma an n   s sp pe ec ciia alliis sa at tiio on n   iin nd de ex x
Our measure of specialisation is provided by the Krugman index (1991a),
which is computed for a country ‘a’ relative to a country ‘b’.  Let us take an
intuitive example.  Suppose that two countries, ‘a’ and ‘b’, export the following
amounts of each of the products.
For a period t, the Krugman specialisation index is defined by the formula: 
with: 
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10. For a survey of concentration and specialisation studies in the EU, see Combes and
Overman (2003).  Concerning the empirical literature based on the NEG models, see Overman
et al. (2003) or Head and Mayer (2003).
() () () ()
kk
a,b ab k K t abs v t v t =− ∑
() () ()
kk k






a xt  
Share of product  
in total exports 
() () ()
kk k





b xt  
Share of product 
in total exports 
() () ()
kk k
bb b k vt xt xt ≡ ∑  
1  10  0,1  500  0,5 
2  90  0,9  500  0,5 
Total  100  1  1,000  1 where i=a,b.   can be exports, employment, production or value added
data, disaggregated in k industries.  The index provides information on the diffe-
rence between production structure in a country ‘a’ and a reference country
‘b’.  It ranges from zero when specialisation is nil to two when specialisation is
complete.  Contrary to other measures of absolute specialisation, such as the
Herfindhal-Hirschmann index, the Krugman index is a relative one: it measures
how specialised country ‘a’ stands relative to country ‘b’.  In the text, the index
is computed for a country ‘a’ relative to the EU-15.
In the example, the formula gives: 
.
We now turn to our own evaluation of international specialisation.
We apply the Krugman index (see box 2) to the candidate countries and
present EU Member States, using sectoral export data covering 72
products (table 6).  The core and the largest countries are the least
specialised.  The peripheral countries, on the other hand, are more
specialised than the EU average.  In southern Europe, Spain’s speciali-
sation is rather stable while Portugal and Greece, initially highly specialised,
have experienced a major diversification of their activities, which reveals
a converging process of industrial structures with the EU average.
Differences in trade specialisation intensity are strong in an enlarged
Union, with a clearly different pattern between core and peripheral
countries.  Moreover, huge disparities appear within the candidate
countries.  The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Poland are more
diversified than peripheral countries such as Portugal and Greece while
the Balkan and Baltic countries exhibit the highest values of the
Krugman index.
Geographic distance from the European core seems to matter as
the most peripheral countries are also the most specialised.  Candidate
countries are generally specialised in resource-intensive industries
(metals, wood and wood products) and labour-intensive industries
(textiles and clothing) while maintaining comparative disadvantages in
capital-intensive industries such as machinery, equipment goods or
chemical products (Freudenberg and Lemoine, 1999).  However, wide
divergences appear among these countries and some of them are
experiencing great changes in their trade specialisation.  The most
advanced CEECs are henceforth getting some new advantages in
technology and capital-intensive sectors while still keeping comparative
advantages in low-tech sectors (Boillot, 2003).  For instance, Hungary
achieved new specialisation in electronic and computer industries and
Estonia in telecommunications at the same time keeping comparative
advantages in food industries (in Hungary) and wood products (Estonia).
By contrast, other Baltic states, Bulgaria and Romania and Poland to a
lesser extent, still exhibit a high share of traditional activities (food
products, metals, textiles) in their export structure.









() , (0.1 0.5) (0.9 0.5) 0.8 ab K t abs abs =− +− =Table 7 provides information on the similarity in export structures
within the CEECs on the one hand, and between the CEECs and the
EU Member States on the other.  First, central European countries have
highly similar export structures relative to the EU, especially Spain and
Portugal.  If they follow a Spanish-type trend, countries such as Hungary
and the Czech Republic and also, but to a lesser extent, Poland and
Slovenia should avoid the risks generated by strong specialisation in
traditional sectors.  On the contrary, such an optimistic view cannot be
held about the more peripheral countries.  They appear more similar
to Greece than to the rest of the EU.  This is particularly the case of
Bulgaria.  Second, export structures in the candidate countries are
especially far from those of Ireland, which experienced strong techno-
logical catch-up.  However, the exception of Hungary is noteworthy
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  90-92  93-95  96-98  99-00 
France  0.288  0.287  0.279  0.270 
Bel-Lux  0.523  0.517  0.498  0.451 
Germany  0.310  0.319  0.325  0.340 
Italy  0.482  0.503  0.531  0.534 
The Netherlands  0.581  0.580  0.609  0.629 
United Kingdom  0.419  0.431  0.407  0.429 
Ireland  0.923  1.014  1.044  1.067 
Denmark  0.684  0.689  0.662  0.639 
Finland  0.885  0.887  0.902  0.968 
Sweden  0.603  0.648  0.642  0.626 
Austria  0.555  0.539  0.484  0.485 
Spain  0.515  0.521  0.525  0.527 
Greece  1.151  1.066  1.021  1.029 
Portugal  0.922  0.913  0.837  0.822 
EU-15  0.449  0.461  0.465  0.473 
Slovenia    0.662  0.662  0.690 
Estonia    0.949  0.949  1.110 
Latvia    1.172  1.223  1.312 
Lithuania    0.990  0.975  1.093 
Czech Republic    0.586  0.551  0.610 
Slovakia    0.681  0.646  0.713 
Hungary    0.622  0.634  0.686 
Poland    0.832  0.741  0.736 
Romania    0.980  1.074  1.097 
Bulgaria    0.889  0.939  0.970 
6. Export specialisation index for EU countries and the CEECs
Sources: CEPII-CHELEM, authors' calculations.with its index value relative to Ireland having a higher value than the
other CEECs’, suggesting the growing importance of high-technology
industries in this country.  Third, similarity of export structures within
CEECs implies that the main competitors of the candidate countries
are still the candidate countries themselves.  For instance, Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia exhibit high values of the index11.

























































































Estonia  0.410                   
Latvia  0.372  0 0. .6 66 62 2                     
Lithuania  0.434  0 0. .6 62 29 9    0 0. .6 61 17 7                 
Czech Rep  0 0. .7 71 19 9    0.403  0.356  0.427             
Slovakia  0 0. .7 72 21 1    0.428  0.418  0.474  0 0. .7 73 38 8             
Hungary  0.554  0.384  0.306  0.396  0 0. .6 60 09 9    0 0. .5 58 81 1           
Poland  0 0. .7 73 34 4    0.463  0.415  0.513  0 0. .7 70 04 4    0 0. .6 66 62 2    0 0. .6 60 00 0         
Romania  0.490  0.481  0.464  0 0. .5 58 87 7    0.466  0 0. .5 55 59 9    0.438  0 0. .5 56 66 6       
Bulgaria  0.480  0.409  0.45  0 0. .5 56 65 5    0.446  0 0. .5 57 73 3    0.424  0.548  0 0. .6 66 61 1     
Spain  0 0. .6 64 44 4    0.397  0.342  0.443  0 0. .7 71 13 3    0 0. .7 72 29 9    0 0. .5 59 96 6    0 0. .6 64 42 2    0.468  0.511 
Greece  0.439  0.463  0.474  0 0. .5 57 75 5    0.404  0.482  0.403  0.472  0.518  0 0. .5 57 79 9   
Portugal  0 0. .6 64 43 3    0.401  0.386  0.490  0 0. .6 64 44 4    0 0. .6 65 57 7    0 0. .5 57 72 2    0 0. .6 64 47 7    0.544  0.501 
Ireland  0.281  0.250  0.189  0.250  0.272  0.240  0.460  0.267  0.226  0.283 
EU-15  0 0. .6 65 54 4    0.421  0.345  0.457  0 0. .6 69 90 0    0 0. .6 63 39 9    0 0. .6 67 73 3    0 0. .6 64 41 1    0.463  0.512 
7. Finger-Kreinin similarity index (see box 3)
Source: CEPI-Chelem, author's calculations.
11. This result can be found in other works (Chevallier et al., 1999).
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Our measure of export similarity is provided by Finger and Kreinin (1979).
Now, suppose that two countries, ‘a’ and ‘b’, export the following amounts of
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2  90  0,9  500  0,5 The ‘export similarity’ measure, computed using the following formula: 
gives: .
In the text, the index is used in order to compare export structures between
two countries ‘a’ and ‘b’ with the rest of the world (country ‘c’ in the formula).
If the two countries ‘a’ and ‘b’ export the same goods to the third market,
the index will take on a value of 1.  If export structures are completely dissimilar,
the index will be zero.
3.2. Moving towards an intra-industry specialisation?
Specialisation indices and trends in intra-industry trade between EU
countries and the CEECs provide similar conclusions.  European trade
is essentially intra-industry, especially in vertical differentiation, whose
increase has been noteworthy since 1985.  However, peripheral
countries are an exception as regards this trend: inter-industry trade
still predominates, despite a tangible catch-up experienced in Spain and
to a lesser extent in Portugal.  Analysing trade patterns between the
EU and the candidate countries shows that inter-industry trade prevails
and that large differences characterise the future EU members.
Considering data from different sources, three distinct groups can
be highlighted (table 8).  First, the Central European countries (Hungary,
Slovenia and the Czech Republic) exhibit a high share of intra-industry
trade which outweighs that of Portugal and Greece.  Poland and Slovakia
stand at a more intermediate level whereas inter-industry trade remains
very predominant in both the Balkan and Baltic countries (from 85% to
95%).  Intra-industry trade in goods differentiated by quality (i.e.  verti-
cally) represents 80 to 90% of total intra-industry trade and has
experienced a significant rise between 1993 and 1996, which argues in
favour of an early convergence process of trade structures towards
the EU standards.  This shift appears more clearly in countries which
had initially large amounts of intra-industry trade, which could mean
larger and larger disparities within the candidate countries.  According
to Freudenberg and Lemoine (1999), some caveats subsist: is the
convergence suggested by trade patterns robust?  Do production struc-
tures follow the same trend?  For institutional reasons (inefficiency in
corporate governance and residual state ownership in the capital of
newly private firms), the slow restructuring is the weak aspect of trans-
ition and can hamper the convergence process (Andreff, 1999).
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Sources: for CEECs, Freudenberg and Lemoine, 1999 and for EU countries, Fontagné et al., 1998.
8. Intra-industry trade in the EU and the CEECs
1996 Intra-industry trade Inter-industry trade































EU-12 (1980) 18.08 35.36 46.57
EU-12 (1985) 17.94 34.54 47.52
EU-12 (1994) 19.23 42.28 38.5
Greece (1980) 2.02 11.33 86.65
Greece (1995) 4.60 9.00 86.50
Spain (1985) 10.12 26.35 63.52
Spain (1995) 19.50 34.20 46.40
Portugal (1985) 4.13 10.45 85.42
Portugal (1995) 10.50 22.10 67.404.What about the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries?
Finally, we analyse the European trade linkages with a sample of
Mediterranean countries having an association agreement with the EU.
If we assume a large integrated area including Mediterranean countries,
the question is how heterogeneous this area would be and how the
implied divergences across nations would add to the regional diver-
gence process within European nations.  Table 9 summarises trade
specialisation indicators for Turkey, the Maghreb countries and Egypt,
compared with EU members and the candidate countries.
Mediterranean countries have very complementary trade structures
relative to the EU.  According to the Krugman index, they are the most
specialised of the sample, except Turkey whose index has quickly
decreased and is close to indices registered in the less advanced
candidate countries.  Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt exhibit similar values
of the index.  Algeria, on the contrary, displays very strong speciali-
sation, due to predominant exports of gas and petroleum products.  All
these countries export a large share of low-value-added manufactured
goods.  For example, textiles account for a significant share of exports
in Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey.  They also display strong comparative
advantages in food and resource-intensive industries.  Finally, Egypt
experiences trade advantages in petroleum products.

































EU-15  0.464*    0.730  17.5  41.6  40.9 
CEECs-10  0.746*  0.730    5.0  24.8  70.2 
Algeria  1.826  0.081  0.068  0.6  1.1  98.4 
Egypt  1.370  0.333  0.393  1.0  3.1  95.9 
Morocco  1.448  0.273  0.341  3.4  5.4  91.2 
Tunisia  1.375  0.305  0.397  4.1  15.2  80.6 
Turkey  1.043  0.502  0.576  6.1  10.2  83.7 
* Weighted average.
**Intra-industry trade shares are given relative to the EU.
Source: Dupuch and al., 2004.
9. Specialisation and trade structures indices in the SEMCs
As regards similarity in trade structures, the SEMCs are much more
different from the EU than the candidate countries, except Turkey.
Conversely, the Mediterranean countries are rather complementary to
the EU according to the Finger index (with Morocco, Tunisia and Egyptdisplaying similar values) while Algeria exhibits very low values of the
index, which result from their strong dependency on resource-intensive
industries.
Shares of intra-industry trade and specialisation indices depict almost
similar evidence.  Overall, the Mediterranean countries have very high
levels of inter-industry trade.  Only Tunisia and Turkey display a
substantial share of intra-industry trade close to 20%, which ranks above
the levels reached by the less advanced CEECs and the Baltic States.
However, intra-industry trade is predominantly of the vertical type (i.e.
traded goods are differentiated in quality ranges).  Conversely, trade
structures in Algeria, Morocco and Egypt are strongly biased towards
inter-industry trade.  Turning to sectoral considerations, intra-industry
trade is much more significant in electric and electronic materials than
in more traditional activities (20% of electronics in Egypt and Morocco,
around 26% of mechanical components and almost 30% of vehicles in
EU-Turkey trade).  Tunisia’s trade is more specific as textiles account
for the bulk of intra-industry trade.  However, these figures result more
from the more intermediate-goods-intensive nature of these industries
than from the ability of countries to attract FDI and develop long-term
comparative advantages in these sectors.
Consequently, differences across locations are still relevant.  On the
one hand, some evidence for diversification emerges from trade struc-
tures in a small number of candidate countries, which now display
comparative advantages in higher-value-added industries.  On the other
hand, Mediterranean countries and the more peripheral Eastern
countries remain specialised in resource- and labour-intensive industries
and appear very complementary to the EU.  Some recent works have
shown some elements of trade diversification and quality upgrading, but
these remain marginal (Chevallier and Freudenberg, 2001).  Moreover,
countries which experience shifts in intra-industry trade based on
textiles and clothing industries, like Tunisia, are likely to suffer more
from the competition coming from China’s entry into the WTO and
the future dismantling of the multi-fibre arrangement than from the
accession of some CEECs to the EU.
Conclusion
The EU enlargement process, bringing in southern and eastern
Mediterranean countries, is noteworthy for many reasons.  The next
enlargement wave is the largest and the most complex the EU has ever
had to deal with since its creation.  It encompasses countries that are
more lagging behind in terms of economic performance than were
Spain, Greece and Portugal when they joined the EEC in the eighties.
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profoundly and rapidly modified their economic and productive struc-
tures.  Under these conditions, this new stage in the European
unification may influence the economic geography both within and
between the Member States more than the preceding waves did.  
Theoretically, in spite of the lack of labour mobility within the EU,
a core-periphery schema is expected to occur as a result of vertical
linkages.  In terms of efficiency, the decrease in transaction costs and
the gains from agglomeration compound each other.  Consequently,
sectoral divergence exhibited by the vertical-linkage models can find
evidence in the EU through a high-skilled core attracting increasing
intensive activities and a low-skilled periphery.  These predictions are
confronted with data relative to the main stylised facts on real and
structural convergence of the candidate countries with the EU.
Two alternative scenarios are discussed.  We show strong diffe-
rences in trade specialisation intensity in an enlarged Union, with a
clearly different pattern between core countries and the periphery.  The
former tend to converge towards the EU standards through the
development of intra-industry trade and the upgrading of specialisation
patterns while the latter remain dependent on comparative advantages
in low-tech and labour-intensive sectors.  The role of FDI in the host
countries’ specialisation pattern changes has been examined in this
paper.  The consequences of FDI in the CEECs’ international speciali-
sation cannot be denied.  In the Spanish case and in some of the
candidate countries, inward FDI has already played an important role
in the shift towards intra-industry specialisation.  In fact, foreign firms
are likely to bring with them technology, know-how and management
structures that help the transition process towards a competitive
market-based economy.  In the case of Mediterranean countries,
benefits from FDI have been negligible until now.  In the last years and
despite the Euromed agreement, FDI inflows have remained low for
various reasons such as unfavourable institutional framework, the slow
pace of privatisation, macroeconomic uncertainty and small market size.
Finally, the picture of a diversified Europe in which nations keep the
bulk of activities should not be altered with the enlargement for the
core countries, including some peripheral countries and some new
CEEC candidates for enlargement.  The core-periphery schema is likely
to persist, with a larger core including Slovenia, a few urban and border
Hungarian and Polish regions, the Czech Republic and Slovakia while
the EU periphery is enlarged to other Eastern and Mediterranean
countries.  In this context, the lack of a regulatory framework at the
EU level in such a heterogeneous area could induce both economic and
political tensions.  Contrary to its founders’ intentions, the result would
be to reduce the large EU to, more or less, a free trade area.
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Pavitt (1984) has developed a sectoral taxonomy of sectors of
production and use of innovation.  He identifies four major groups of
sectors, with respect of the source of the innovations that they use
and to the influence of science on the industrial performance.
— ‘Supplier-dominated’ sectors are broadly traditional industries in
which innovative activity is rather limited to adaptation of new capital
equipments and intermediate inputs which have been developed and
produced by upstream suppliers.  They include textile, clothing, leather,
printing and publishing, wood products).
— ‘Scale-intensive’ industries mostly rely on scale economies in
production and design or R&D provided both internally or by
equipment suppliers.  This group includes transport equipment, cars,
electrical consumer durables, metal manufacturing, parts of the chemical
industry…
— ‘Specialised supplier’ industries embody a specialised knowledge
in design and equipment-building.  They generate products aimed at
specific applications, market segments or single users.  Typically, this
group includes mechanical and instruments engineering.
— ‘Science-based’ sectors include the electronics industries and
most of the chemical industries (pharmaceuticals).  Major innovations
as well as the improvements in process yields are frequent in these
sectors where R&D and laboratories are key elements.  A high
proportion of their product innovation enters a wide number of sectors
as capital or intermediate inputs.
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